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ABSTRACT: This paper suggests a way of thinking about the legal reasoning done by conscientious judges 
working in a legal system during periods when those judges believed that their Supreme Court was 
malfunctioning. Seeing a legal system as a shared cooperative activity allows us to best understand how 
legal decision-making can remain consistent when it contains elements at the highest level which are 
believed not to be functioning properly. 
 





How should non-corrupt judges alter their legal reasoning when the legal system they 
operate within is generally acceptable but has a Supreme Court that they believe to be not 
following proper standards in making its decisions? I argue that if we view judges 
seeking to maintain the rule of law as engaged in a shared cooperative activity, this 
illuminates the options available to decent judges in difficult circumstances. The 
experience of Argentina helps to illustrate these features. 
 Since my claims here are primarily designed to illustrate the advantages of 
thinking of legal cultures in certain ways and of the implications of so characterizing 
them for issues concerning the nature of legal reasoning in difficult circumstances, those 
who doubt my empirical claims can simply move to the closest possible world where they 
are roughly true. 
 
2. THE NATURE OF A LEGAL SYSTEM  
 
I take a legal system to be a system of norms (rules and principles) having authority over 
a group of spatio-temporally identifiable individuals. The norms consist of both primary 
rules (which state duties and obligations), secondary rules (which grant powers and state 
how to create, change, and abolish primary rules, and state what procedures are to be 
used in interpreting the norms within the system), and a rule of recognition (which is 
adopted by those who operate the system of norms) and where it is not obviously morally 
inappropriate to have a system of punitive enforcement of such norms.  
 Anything that claims to be a legal system claims authority over people and 
anything that actually is a legal system actually has such authority. One of the most 
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puzzling problems in the philosophy of law is how to explain the source of legal 
authority. Claiming authority over people is not unique to legal systems; moralities, 
religions, and superstitions also make such claims. However, legal systems get their 
authority in a somewhat complex way. 
Ordinary laws imposing duties on citizens are usually (following H.L.A. Hart) 
called primary rules. Then there are secondary rules that grant powers to change our 
duties and those which establish procedures and persons authorized to make authoritative 
determinations about legal disputes. (Hart calls these rules of change and rules of 
adjudication.) There is a further secondary rule known as the rule of recognition. This 
rule states how potential laws become actual laws in a given legal system. Accordingly, 
primary rules get their authority by having been made in the way the rule of recognition 
states is the authoritative way to become a legal rule. (A similar and slightly more 
complex story can be told regarding rules of change and adjudication.)  
Of course, this raises the question of how the rule of recognition gets its authority. 
Hart’s response—the most important insight in the entire history of the philosophy of 
law—is that the rule of recognition gets its authority by being recognized by those who 
operate the legal system as the authoritative way to make, change, and adjudicate laws. 
While the issue of what it is for legal officials to recognize the rule of recognition 
remains an uncompleted philosophic project, Hart said that when we look at officials 
from the internal point of view (from the perspective of someone working within the 
legal system) we see that they must have a “critical reflective attitude” toward the legal 
system. He offered some insightful observations about just what is required to have a 
group of people have the sort of critical reflective attitude toward the operation of a set of 
rules and principles to make it into a legal system, but his remarks fall far short of a 
systematic account of this essential feature. Since it is only when a sufficient number of 
people coordinate on the same rule of recognition that a legal system comes into 
existence, we need to understand what are the necessary conditions for creating a legal 
system or for having one come into existence. 
The most promising approach to developing Hart’s insight into a rigorous account 
is that taken by a group of philosophers—Scott Shapiro and Jules Coleman being the 
most prominent—who have been working to provide a more rigorous and systematic 
account of what it is for a group of officials to have the critical reflective attitude toward 
the actions of each other necessary for the formation and maintenance of a legal system. 
They have argued that legal officials must be engaged in (what Michael Bratman called) 
a shared cooperative activity (SCA) that gives rise to the accepted rule of recognition. On 
this view the critical reflective attitude Hart claims legal official must have to create and 
sustain a legal system arises (or consists in) a group of people engaging in a SCA, the 
success of which makes them into legal officials. 
It might be objected that the rule of recognition cannot be a SCA, since it, like all 
rules, is an abstract object and social practices are not abstract objects. While it is true 
that the rule of recognition comes into existence only if it is practiced, this does not mean 
that it is merely a cooperative social phenomenon, such as deciding to go for a walk with 
a partner, or playing a duet. If the rule of recognition just consisted in the behaviour of 
the officials whose acting in such a way brings a practice into existence, then it could not 
serve as a standard by which their actions (attributing legal authority to, or changing, or 
removing a law) are criticisable. If the behaviour of officials is the only content of the 
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rule, then no behaviour could possibly deviate from the rule. If the rule is nothing more 
than the practice , then going against common practice could not be criticisable. The rule 
of recognition guides the behaviour of officials and serves as a standard by which they 
evaluate their own actions. It is logically impossible for there to be the entire content of 
the rule of recognition—the rule that sets standard for valid criticisms of the actions 
themselves. (Since Wittgenstein and his commentators have spilled a lot of ink on this 
matter and since I have nothing to add to the issues involved here, I will only note that it 
does not really matter what one’s favourite interpretation of rules is, since all plausible 
accounts allow that rules can and typically do have a range which exceeds that of the 
behaviour which they govern.) 
There are two aspects to the normativity of the rule of recognition: its being a 
reason for action and its being the case that the way others operate within the rule gives 
one a reason for modifying the way one understands and follows the rule oneself. The 
normativity of the rule of recognition is revealed both by its capacity to coordinate 
behaviour and, through general acceptance of the rule, its promotion of the belief that 
officials do and must take the appropriate critical reflective attitude (the internal point of 
view) toward the rule. The internal point of view leads to the convergence of behaviour 
between officials and allows for the authority that makes legal systems possible. This is 
usually referred to as the conventionality thesis. Convergence of behaviour can be seen if 
we recall Margaret Gilbert’s helpful example of the case of two people going for a walk 
together, as opposed to two people who just happen to be walking beside each other to 
the same destination. In the former case, but not the latter, the behaviour of each person 
provides the other with reasons to alter her own behaviour. (One person turning left is a 
reason in itself for her partner to turn left, provided they are taking a walk together. If two 
people are just each out walking, one person turning gives the other no reason to alter her 
course.) Similarly, if you and I are both judges and you decide a case in a certain way—
say by ruling that once there has been relevant legislation, custom is less important than it 
is in cases where there is no relevant legislation—that gives me a reason for doing the 
same thing when a similar case comes to my court.  
It has long been understood (thanks mainly to Hobbes) that without a legal system 
we all find ourselves in a prisoner’s dilemma, and that having a legal system (a kinder 
solution than Hobbes’s authoritarian Leviathan) solves the prisoner’s dilemma for us. 
This seems like an easy fix, but law can solve the prisoner’s dilemma if, and only if, law 
is possible. Law is possible on this view only if some people come to a consensus on the 
proper rule of recognition. The problem is that (would-be) legal officials find themselves 
in a game known as the battle of the sexes. Each (would-be) official has her favoured way 
of running the legal system (her favourite rule of recognition), but she prefers having 
some rule or recognition to no rule at all and hence no legal system (which will result if 
no consensus can be reached). Without coordination on a particular rule of recognition, 
there is no legal system and, hence, society is in a state of anarchy. Since the typical way 
to solve the battle of the sexes games is to have a coordinating convention, we can think 
of a legal system as a solution to a game of partial conflict. Current thinking is that if we 
see legal officials as engaged in an SCA, we will have a clearer and more rigorous 
account of Hart’s insights.  
The three characteristics of shared cooperative activities are those that, if a SCA is 




(i) Mutual responsiveness: Each participating agent attempts to be responsive to the intentions 
and actions of the other […] Each seeks to guide her behaviour with an eye to the behaviour 
of the other, knowing that the other seeks to do likewise. 
(ii) Commitment to the joint activity: The participants each have an appropriate commitment 
(though perhaps for different reasons) to the joint activity, and their mutual responsiveness is 
in pursuit of this commitment. 
(iii) Commitment to mutual support: Each agent is committed to supporting the efforts of the 
other to play her role in the joint activity […] These commitments to support each other put 
us in a position to perform the joint activity successfully even if we each need help in certain 
ways. (Bratman, p. 328; Coleman, p. 96) 
 
The work remaining is to see to just what extent Bratman’s ideas about SCA’s need to be 
tweaked to make them fit legal systems. (For instance, I have argued in “From MADness 
to SANity” that all solutions to prisoner’s dilemmas must solve assurance games also 
and, while SCAs obviously do this, the proper characterization of this accomplishment 
awaits completion.) 
 Characterizing judges and other legal officials as engaged in a SCA such that if 
and when, but only if and when, they succeed in their SCA is there actually a functioning 
legal system makes it much easier to see how the legal positivist view of law captures 
two leading features of law which natural law theorists have long pointed to as under-
appreciated by legal positivists. Since SCAs must, by their very nature, meet certain 
formal conditions, this type of positivist account can easily accommodate the insightful 
observations made by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law. First, we can see both that 
Fuller is correct in thinking that anything which is a legal system must meet certain 
formal conditions (and that those conditions by their very nature rule out certain forms of 
immorality) and how this is perfectly compatible with the positivist view that law and 
morality are conceptually distinct. Second, the idea (which is at least as old as Aquinas) 
that law necessarily serves to promote and protect the common good, while ultimately 
untenable, is shown to have the plausibility that it obviously has and the appearance of 
being such a deep insight about the nature of law. If only by engaging in a certain kind of 
SCA do those who engage in that activity both allow for the existence of law and the 
value of the rule of law, then it is going to look to observers as though law necessarily 
serves the common good. Positivists now have a way of showing why this mistake is so 
prevalent. (An alternative understanding would be that the concept of the rule of law 
exhausts the idea of the common good. This would go a long way toward collapsing the 
distinction between legal positivism and natural law theory.) 
 Finally, it is important to note that all legal systems we know of include coercive 
enforcement. Though this is not a necessary condition for something being a legal 
system, it is the case that anything that is a legal system must at least make the idea of 
coercive enforcement of its rules open as a legitimate moral possibility.  
 
3. TWO DIFFICULT PERIODS IN ARGENTINA 
 
Argentina has been an independent nation with a more or less fully functioning legal 
system since the 1850s. The constitution adopted in 1912 models the Argentine 
government on a combination of American and German/French ideas. From the 
American model is taken the idea of three distinct branches, a congress providing the 
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legislative function, a president and vice-president heading the executive branch, and a 
judicial system concerned with protecting constitutional rights, interpreting legislation, 
and coordinating legal decisions. 
 Though the Argentine judiciary has frequently been maligned and has often been 
characterized by observers as thoroughly corrupt, this, I believe, is inaccurate. There are, 
and always have been, many fine judges working in Argentina, people who (sometimes at 
considerable personal cost and risk) have worked hard to help establish and maintain the 
ideals of the rule of law. It is this group that I wish to focus on. How can we understand 
the behaviour of a good judge in circumstances where many other judges are corrupt, or 
at least are believed to be so? I will look at two periods in Argentina’s history where most 
judges believed (correctly, in my view, but the truth of the belief is not essential here) that 
members of the Supreme Court were corrupt. I want to show that seeing the non-corrupt 
judges as engaged in the SCA of preserving the legal system and the rule of law in the 
face of what they take to be a very serious threat is an illuminating way to understand 
their behaviour.  
 What follows is a very truncated account of two periods when the Argentine 
Supreme Court was believed to be seriously corrupt. It is fortunate that the accuracy of 
these descriptions does not matter a great deal to the conceptual points I wish to make. 
Those readers who have radically different views about the history of Argentina should 
simply substitute their own views for the account below; all that matters is that most 
decent judges believed that the Supreme Court was operating inappropriately during these 
periods: 
Period I: In 1976, after a period of economic hardship, political instability, and 
widespread violence by non-government agencies on both the left and the right directed 
toward the government, businesses, trade unions, and individuals, the Argentine military 
took power in a coup. This led to a guerra sucia (or dirty war), during which there were 
about 30,000 desaparecidos, people who simply “disappeared.” Following an Argentine 
invasion in 1982 to recapture Las Islas Malvinas from the British, the United Kingdom 
attacked Argentina and the Argentine military suffered a humiliating defeat. Shortly 
thereafter, in 1983, democracy was restored with the surprise election of Raúl Alfonsín to 
the Presidency.  
During the military dictatorship, from 1976 to 1983, it was widely believed by 
those operating the Argentine legal system that the country’s Supreme Court was not 
performing its legal duties in a manner compatible with its legal responsibilities. (Again, 
though there is compelling evidence that this was the case, the relevant point here is that 
other legal officials, particularly honest judges working at other levels, believed it to be 
the case.) It was not long after the return to democracy that legal officials throughout 
Argentina came to have a somewhat higher opinion of the work of the Supreme Court. 
Period II: In 1989, after a period of economic hardship, civil unrest, and hyper-
inflation, Carlos Menem was elected President of Argentina. In a stealthy and dramatic 
move whose legality was highly questionable, President Menem (and his Congressional 
supporters) increased the size of the Supreme Court and appointed new justices who 
regularly and almost automatically sided with the president on all issues. (They became 
known as the “automatic majority” because they always decided—usually without giving 
reasons—that whatever President Menem had done was constitutionally legitimate.) 
Other legal officials came to believe that the Supreme Court was not performing its role 
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in the proper manner. (This belief lingered long after Menem left office in 1999. Indeed, 
proceedings were still underway years later to remove the last of the Menem appointees.) 
 
3. COOPERATION WITHOUT COOPERATORS 
 
The question before us, then, is how does the neo-Hartian characterization of a legal 
system sketched above allow us to understand the behaviour of those legal officials 
during the two periods just described. In what follows I will concentrate on judges, but I 
believe that everything I say applies to other legal officials (jailors, police, patent 
officials, and so forth).  
 How can a legal system be a SCA that one can properly, in good conscience, 
support when a leading component of the SCA is (at least as one sees it) undermining the 
SCA itself? This might seem like an impossible account of what judges could do, but a 
moment’s reflection reveals this is not so. Consider other examples of SCAs, such as 
performing a symphony. If the conductor goes wildly off tempo, the musicians are faced 
with a problem: should they follow the conductor? Stick to a strict interpretation of the 
score? Do something in between? As a matter of fact, I understand that when this 
happens the musicians usually try to pay lip-service to the actions of the conductor but 
collectively try to produce the best performance they can without obviously defying the 
conductor’s instructions. Indeed, after a little hesitation, orchestral players usually revert 
to the default interpretation of the work in question and simply try to perform as well as 
possible in the circumstances. If, say, the conductor shows up drunk, then as soon as the 
performers realize this they try to work as much as they can independently of “the 
directions” they are receiving from the conductor.  
Of course, there is the following complication: part of what makes a orchestral 
performance a good one is that the orchestra at least appears to follow the directions of 
the conductor. So a problem for the musicians is how to simultaneously play the music as 
well as possible while not appearing to be completely disregarding what the conductor is 
doing. And the same is true in a legal system. Judges who have decided that the decisions 
of their Supreme Court are not compatible with the ideal of the rule of law have, like our 
imagined musicians, both to perform the tasks of standard legal and legislative 
interpretation as well as possible and to still appear not to be completely ignoring the 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court since part of their job—part of the SCA they are 
engaged in—is preserving the rule of law which requires lower court judges to pay some 
attention to the decisions of higher courts and, in particular, the Supreme Court. 
 This is just what happened in the case of the Argentine legal system. A good 
judge is one who both follows the standards of legislative interpretation and who takes 
guidance in so-called “hard cases” from the interpretive decisions of higher courts. In the 
Anglo-American system the doctrine of stare decisis requires judges to adhere to the 
principles used by higher courts in all their subsequent decisions to which those 
principles apply. In systems like Argentina’s, where the doctrine does not apply, there is 
still the pressure of expected compliance that being engaged in a SCA exerts on a judge 
who is committed to maintaining the rule of law. She wants both to be faithful to the way 
other courts are deciding cases and to be maintaining the traditional standards of statutory 
interpretation. Some circumstances require weighing one value more heavily than 
another. In those circumstances where there is a widespread belief that the Supreme 
6 
LEGAL REASONING WHEN THE SUPREME COURT IS CORRUPT 
Court is corrupt, the good judge—the judge who wishes to contribute as much as she can 
to the shared cooperative activity that is the legal system within which she operates—will 
devote less (or no) attention to the Supreme Court’s decisions and more to those of her 
fellow judges who she believes share her dedication. (Just how far she can go in deviating 
from what the Supreme Court has decided without doing more damage than good to the 
SCA of maintaining the legal system that she and other conscientious judges are engaged 
in is, of course, a very difficult issue.) 
  During the military dictatorship and during (and right after) President Menem 
was in power, many judges found themselves in this predicament. The majority treated 
their Supreme Court in much the same way that professional musicians do when they 
think that the conductor is taking gross musical liberties—they sought the best way to 
carry on in difficult circumstances, looking more to each other for guidance and less to 
the source they normally would. It is fortunate that Argentina’s legal system survived 
both these challenging periods and, despite the strains imposed upon it, provided the 
people of Argentina with something that properly deserves to be called a legal system. 
 
4. AN ADVANTAGE OF SCA UNDERSTANDING OF POSITIVISM 
 
A major philosophic advantage of this way of looking at the law is that it shows why the 
standard alternative to legal positivism—the various versions of natural law theory—have 
such as strong hold on so many legal theorists’ imagination. If the role of the judge is 
seen as a SCA and that SCA constitutes the existence conditions for the rule of law, then 
the idea, so dear to natural law theorists, that there is a conceptual connection between 
law and morality (and that the nature of that conception is that law serves to further the 
so-called “common good” of the community) becomes much more plausible. The 
common good, at least if understood as being the preservation of the rule of law, is 
something that is part of what it is to create and maintain a legal system. Of course, the 
positivist idea, that law and morality are conceptually distinct is also preserved on this 
view. A nation might well have judges (and others) engaged in the SCA needed to 
preserve a legal system—that needed to create and maintain the rule of law—and 
nonetheless be oppressing large parts of the population in grossly immoral ways. (Not all 
SCAs are good things. Criminal gangs are SCAs.) 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Working within a legal system when the executive branch of government has corrupted 
the highest court within that system poses great difficulties for those faithful to the values 
of the rule of law. This is especially so when police forces have been corrupted and the 
military is usurping powers for evil ends. Such circumstances require honest faithful 
judges to find creative means to keep the rule of law intact. Seeing a legal system as a 
SCA helps illuminate both the difficulties faced by such people when former cooperators 
defect. It also serves to illuminate how, despite the obstacles they face, they are able to 
achieve their goal. That this way of looking at legal reasoning must be (at least close to) 
correct is shown by the fact that those sceptics who hold that the rule of law broke down 
during either or both of the aforementioned periods in Argentine history are claiming 




normal workings of the legal system, the rule of law broke down. But that is just to claim 
that the military dictatorship and/or President Menem succeeded in making it the case 
that those operating the legal system were, despite many brave and valiant efforts, unable 
to find a way to maintain a SCA in such difficult circumstances. Perhaps that is so. But 
that too serves to confirm my main contention: that we should look at the operation of a 
legal system as the successful functioning of a SCA. The sort of practices that it takes to 
construct and sustain a legal system are ones that require the judges and other officials  
who operate the system see themselves as engaged in a project which we who analyse 
those systems will see as shared cooperative activities. 
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